



One of the great advantages of teaching torts is that the case law tells so 
many colorful stories. Trains are constantly crashing, catching fire, or otherwise 
wreaking havoc on the community.1 Boats and barges are always sinking, 
or smashing into things, or tossing their occupants into the sea.2 Barrels of 
flour (and sometimes chairs) randomly fly out of building windows.3 People 
are constantly dropping things,4 falling into things,5 or throwing things at 
other people.6 There are heroic rescues,7 man-eating sharks,8 spurned lovers,9 
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1.  See, e.g., Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990); 
Watson v. Ky. & Ind. Bridge & R.R. Co., 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910); Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. 
Paul Ry. Co., 21 Minn. 207 (1875); Brower v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 103 A. 
166 (N.J. 1918); Globe Malleable Iron & Steel Co. v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 
124 N.E. 109 (N.Y. 1919).
2. See, e.g., Rodi Yachts, Inc. v. Nat’l Marine, Inc., 984 F.2d 880 (7th Cir. 1993); Frank v. United 
States, 250 F.2d 178 (3d Cir. 1978); Gardner v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th 
Cir. 1962); United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955); Johnson v. Kosmos Portland 
Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1933); The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932); N.Y. 
Cent. R.R. Co. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334 (2d Cir. 1920); In re Trans-Pac. Fishing & Packing Co., 
152 F. Supp. 44 (W.D. Wash. 1957); Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 
1910); Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co., [1961] UKPC 1 (appeal 
taken from N.S.W.).
3. See, e.g., Larson v. St. Francis Hotel, 188 P.2d 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948); Byrne v. Boadle, (1863) 
159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Exch.); 2 Hurl. & Colt. 722.
4. See, e.g., Combustion Eng’g Co. v. Hunsberger, 187 A. 825 (Md. 1936); In re Polemis & 
Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.) (Eng.).
5. See, e.g., Alexander v. New Castle, 17 N.E. 200 (Ind. 1888); Yania v. Bigan 155 A.2d 343 (Pa. 
1959). 
6. See, e.g., Manning v. Grimsley, 643 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1981); Crabtree v. Dawson, 83 S.W. 557 (Ky. 
1904); Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1958). 
7. See, e.g., Eckert v. Long Island R.R. Co., 43 N.Y. 502 (1871).
8. See, e.g., The Margharita, 140 F. 820 (5th Cir. 1905).
9. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); Riss v. New York, 240 
N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. 1968).
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witchdoctors,10 circus animals,11 religious cults.12 The stories are unexpected, 
tragic, amusing, compelling. And within each story there is a subplot about 
lawyers and judges strategically wading through the facts in a search for justice.
My favorite story to discuss with torts students is not in any casebook, and 
it does not teach any legal doctrine. It is a story about my first experience with 
a personal injury attorney.  
I was eighteen years old, lying in a hospital bed with a respirator pumping 
bursts of air into my lungs. My head was bound to my torso with a “halo” 
brace—so named because it consists of a metal ring that circles the head, 
fastened at four points by screws that have been drilled into the skull; the ring 
is connected to a brace that wraps around the chest to immobilize the neck. 
With one minor exception, I could not feel or move any of my limbs. The most 
I could do was flex my biceps to bring my hand to my shoulder, after which I 
could not straighten my arm without help. I could not speak; I had to mouth 
words to my parents and the nurses.
This miserable existence had started three weeks earlier. I was crossing the 
street (not at a cross walk) when I was struck by a car. As I remember the 
incident, I saw the car coming and thought I could beat it. But at the last 
second the car changed lanes, swiping me onto the hood. The impact broke 
my neck. The driver, a 16-year-old girl, was on her way home from a friend’s 
house.  
I have a vivid memory of lying in the street just after the accident and 
hearing someone in the distance weeping uncontrollably. I asked my brother 
(who was at the scene) who was screaming. His answer: “That’s the girl who 
was driving the car.”
When we learned that the paralysis was likely permanent, my father met 
with Jay Peck, a friend and lawyer who had some personal injury experience. 
Jay did some research and talked with the lawyer who was representing the 
girl who had been driving the car that hit me. He determined that there might 
be a claim for negligence, depending on whether we could show the girl was 
driving carelessly and changed lanes improperly. But there was no pot of gold 
awaiting us if we succeeded. The girl had minimum liability insurance on the 
car (then a mere $10,000—enough to pay my hospital bills for a day or two). 
We could attempt to go after the girl’s family, but they weren’t wealthy.
At the time of the accident, I knew nothing about how people with 
disabilities lived. I imagined that I would never work again, that I would never 
get married or have a family, that I would be an outcast, socially rejected and 
unable to support myself.  Suddenly, every negative assumption I had about 
people with disabilities was staring back at me in the mirror.  
10. See, e.g., Oles v. Pittsburg Times, 2 Pa. Super. 130 (1896).
11. See, e.g., Behrens v. Bertram Mills Circus Ltd.  [1957] 2 Q.B. 1 (Eng.).
12. See, e.g., Eilers v. Coy, 582 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Minn. 1984); Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 
(Minn. 1980).
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Over the next few weeks, I slowly regained some movement in my atrophied 
arms and learned to breathe without a respirator. Soon, however, it became 
clear that the great majority of the paralysis was permanent.  I was probably 
somewhere between the second and third stages of grief the next time we met 
with Jay.  He laid out our options in cold detail. If we didn’t sue, the statute 
of limitations would run out in four years. If we did sue, the outcome of the 
case would depend largely upon whether the jury believed my version of what 
happened or hers. If everything went well, we might get some money.  But 
then Jay added a caveat to the “best-case scenario”: the girl’s family could lose 
their house and I would still be paralyzed.
This was a rotten thing to hear, and I can’t imagine Jay was thrilled to be 
the one to give me the message. In my fragile state, I could have easily been 
persuaded to blame someone else for my situation. I would have welcomed 
an excuse to characterize my sorrow as a need for justice and to channel my 
anger toward a specific target. But that is not what a good lawyer does. A good 
lawyer explains the various options and their likely consequences. He helps 
the client see that there is more at stake in litigation than the client’s immediate 
situation.
When I use this story in my torts class, I do not tell the students that it is 
about me. When we are discussing damages, often the last day of the semester, 
I tell the students that I am going to give a closing argument in a negligence 
case and that they must, acting as jurors, decide the damage award appropriate 
for the case. I tell them that the jury has already found that the defendant was 
negligent and identified the amount of damages for medical expenses and lost 
wages;13 now they just need to fix the amount of damages for past and future 
pain and suffering. 
I start my closing argument by asking, “How much is your independence 
worth?” As I describe the facts of my case (in the third person and without 
disclosing anything about the driver), I draw upon the fears that haunted 
me when I first confronted disability. Will this boy ever be able to find the 
happiness he had before the accident? Will he ever be able to go to college? 
Will he ever get married and have a family? Will he ever be able to work and 
have a career? Think about how much you value being able to travel, compete 
in sports, and be master of your own fate. How much would I have to pay you 
to live in this boy’s shoes?
Surprisingly, very few students guess that the story is about me. Perhaps 
my closing argument is too persuasive. When I poll the students for their 
decision on damages, the numbers vary widely, but they are always on the 
high side for this kind of negligence action, ranging from $1 million to more 
than $100 million. I toy with the students a bit by revealing that the defendant 
is a 16-year-old girl whose family has no significant assets. I tell them that a 
13. I realize that having students assume negligence stacks the deck. In my case, it was 
uncertain whether the negligence claim would succeed on the merits. But I do not think this 
assumption taints the experiment given that the only question I am posing to students is the 
amount of pain and suffering damages.
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verdict for more than a half a million dollars will force the girl’s family into 
bankruptcy. Based on this new information, I ask, does anyone want to reduce 
the amount of their damage award? A few students squirm, but most of them 
stick to their guns.
When I reveal that this is not a hypothetical but a true story about how I 
came to use a wheelchair, the room grows quiet. Eventually, a student asks 
what everyone else is wondering: “How much did you get in damages?”
I tell them that I received no recovery. Nothing. In fact, I did not sue. Why? 
Because I had a good lawyer.
No matter how much time we have spent during the semester talking about 
the economic and emotional costs of litigation and the benefits of early dispute 
resolution, this answer still takes students by surprise. The good lawyer, they 
automatically assume, is the lawyer who can form an argument out of thin air 
and bring home victory at trial. Lawyers litigate, and good lawyers win. How 
could a good lawyer leave a client with a serious disability and no money?
I like this story because it forces students to confront the limits of the 
judicial system. We might like to think that for every innocent victim there 
is a malevolent (and wealthy?) villain, that all great harms are capable of 
compensation, that the arm of justice reaches at least half as far as the bowels 
of mercy.  The truth is that the great majority of harms we suffer in life go 
uncompensated.14
This leads into a discussion of whether money is a good proxy for 
compensation. Everyone agrees that having money is not the same thing as 
being able to walk. But perhaps if I had received some recovery following my 
injury, I would have been able to adjust more easily to being paralyzed.15 Or 
perhaps litigating would have made matters worse by focusing my attention 
on my losses16 and then left me dependent on unsustainable financial habits.17 
14. “Compensation” is a strange concept. When we speak of compensation, we assume that 
everyone has a right to a negligence-free existence, as though we were entitled to the 
benefits of living in society without the costs. The moral imperative of just compensation is 
overshadowed by the dumb luck that controls who gets an award of damages. Would I have 
been more deserving of compensation if I had been run over by Bill Gates?
15. I was fortunate to have health insurance and family support. If I had not had support, I 
doubt that any amount of money would have made the transition easier.
16. It is interesting to discuss how a trial might affect the self-image of someone new to disability, 
as well as the perspective of those observing. An excellent vehicle for this discussion is the 
opening scene of A Civil ACtion (Touchstone/Paramount Pictures 1998). Note how passive 
and pathetic the plaintiff is in that scene. He does not operate his own (power) wheelchair, 
takes no part in the settlement negotiations, is underdressed for court, speaks no audible 
words, and expresses no emotion when the settlement is reached. His very presence causes 
one of the jurors to weep. How would you feel about yourself if people wept when they saw 
you? For more on the problems with the specter of disability in the courtroom, see Anne 
Bloom & Paul Steven Miller, Blindsight: How We See Disabilities in Tort Litigation, 86 WAsh. l. 
Rev. 709, 727 (2011).
17. Anecdotal evidence suggests that for some newly-disabled litigants, a large damages 
award simply exaggerates the consequences of pre-existing strong or weak coping skills. 
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We also discuss whether the jury—or anyone for that matter—can reliably 
divine the consequences of a life-altering injury. I point out to students that, 
for the most part, the horrors of disability that I dramatically evoked in my 
closing statement—isolation, financial dependence, stigma, disappointment—
did not actually come to pass in my case. Indeed, I can easily say that despite 
various ups and downs, my life is currently better than it was before the 
accident. Like most people, well-meaning jurors are apt to rely upon their own 
fears and assumptions about disability, even though those assumptions may 
be misplaced.18  
This exercise is not intended to suggest that a good lawyer is one who 
advises clients not to litigate. To the contrary, I hope students recognize that 
often litigation is the best way to bring justice to the broader community. 
What I hope students learn from my tort story is how important it is for a 
lawyer to be a counselor. In the moment when emotions are running high and 
the future is uncertain, a good lawyer is one who sees beyond the immediate 
situation, explains what a lawsuit can and cannot accomplish, and helps the 
client decide to do the right thing.
Studies of lottery winners suggest a similar phenomenon. See Robert Frank, Will Winning 
the Lottery Ruin Your Life?, WAll st. J. Blog (March 30, 2012, 11:14 AM), http://blogs.wsj.
com/wealth/2012/03/30/will-winning-the-lottery-ruin-your-life/ (summarizing studies and 
noting “sudden wealth merely exaggerates your current situation”).
18. Carol J. Gill summarizes the counterintuitive results of research on quality of life and 
disability: “A remarkably consistent finding across studies using widely varying samples 
and methods is that life satisfaction does not diminish with increasing degree of physical 
impairment. In fact, several studies indicate that persons with ‘severe’ physical disabilities, 
such as spinal cord quadriplegia and neuromuscular disabilities requiring mechanical 
ventilation, express greater life satisfaction than do those with less disabling conditions.” 
Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disability, and Assisted Suicide: An Examination of Relevant Empirical 
Evidence and Reply to Batavia, 6 PsyChol. PuB. Pol’y & l. 526, 529 (2000) (citations omitted).
